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Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and Labor Tax Cut
Policy in the Zero Lower Bound
Lorant Kaszab
June 28, 2012
Abstract
This paper nds that labor tax cut can be an e¤ective policy tool to mitigate
the negative e¤ects of a shock that made the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate binding if the economy features rule-of-thumb households (besides
Ricardian ones) and nominal rigidities in prices and wages. Our results are
meant to contribute to the discussion initiated by Eggertsson (2010a) who
found labor tax cut policy destabilising under zero nominal interest rate in a
New Keynesian economy consisting only Ricardian consumers.
JEL classication: E52, E62
Keywords: scal policy, zero lower bound, labor tax cut, New Keynesian
1 Introduction
Following the enaction of the American Recovery and Reinvestment package of 2009
in the United States there has been discussion on the sign and magnitude of scal
multipliers. The $787 billion scal package contains payroll tax cuts as well1. On
one hand some inuential papers concluded that an increase in non-productive gov-
ernment spending can be very e¤ective in stimulating the economy under the recent
Cardi¤ Business School, Economics section, Cardi¤ University, Colum Drive, Cardi¤, CF10
3EU, UK. Email: kaszabl@cardi¤.ac.uk
1In December 2011 President Obama announced that the payroll tax cut is extended until end
of 2012.
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zero nominal interest rate environment (see, e.g., Christiano et al. (2011), Eggerts-
son (2010) and Woodford (2010))2. On the other hand it turned out that labor tax
cuts can be contractionary when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is
binding (see Eggertsson (2010a, 2010b)). Christiano (2010) showed that an increase
in the labor tax rate is not e¤ective in stimulating the economy when we have wage-
setting frictions beyond the usual price-setting block in the new-Keynesian model
as well. The latter is true because changes in the labor tax rate operates through
the labor supply curve which is largely irrelevant in the new-Keynesian model with
wage rigidity.
There is a growing empirical literature which founds labor tax cuts being stim-
ulative. In a well-known study using narrative accounts Romer and Romer (2010)
found that tax increases are contractionary. Also, Mertens and Ravn (2011) found
using a new narrative account of federal tax liability changes to proxy tax shocks
that the short run e¤ects of a tax decrease on output are positive and large. Hall
(2009) reviews several empirical studies arguing that households do respond with an
increase in their consumption expenditures to a temporary cut in payroll tax. Thus,
there is enough empirical evidence in support of the positive e¤ects of a labor tax
cut.
Christiano (2010) argued that the labor tax cut can happen to be stimulative in a
model featuring standard Keynesian elements like the presence of rule-of-thumb (or
rule-of-thumb/non-Ricardian) consumers who are spending their increase in dispos-
able income after an income tax cut. Especially, he concludes that the inclusion of
rule-of-thumb consumers might turn the negative sign of the labor tax cut multiplier
of Eggertsson (2010) into positive, which possibility deserves to be explored.
This paper investigates whether the incorporation of rule-of-thumb (or non-
Ricardian)3 consumers into the baseline new-Keynesian model can render labor tax
cut policy desirable in stabilisation of the economy. We found that the labor tax
cut can be an e¤ective policy tool in an economy with wage-setting frictions. The
2These papers assume lump-sum taxation. However, Uhlig (2010) used a simple neoclassical
model without nominal rigidities and assumed that spending is nanced with distortionary tax-
ation (using marginal capital and labor tax rates). He found low multipliers. Also Cogan et al.
(2009) found low multipliers in case of a permanent stimulus in contrast to a transitory stimulus
assumed in the previously cited papers. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) considered the Smets and
Wouters setup (2007) augmented with rule-of-thumb consumers and derived low multipliers under
distortionary taxation.
3Rule-of-thumb households are excluded from the nancial market. Hence, they have no
consumption-savings tradeo¤ (lack of Euler equation) and their decision problem is restricted to
the optimal choice between consumption and leisure. The inclusion of rule-of-thumb households
into DSGE models is a trivial way of generating incomplete asset markets.
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most relevant literature on models containing rule-of-thumb consumers are Mankiw
(2000), Alvarez et al. (2001), Gali et al. (2004, 2007), Bilbiie (2008). The model
used in this paper is closest to Ascari et al. (2011), Furlanetto (2011), Furlanetto and
Seneca (2009) who enrich the model of Gali et al. (2007) with wage-setting frictions.
Furthermore, we make use of Rossi (2012) who adds a detailed scal block to Gali
et al. (2007) framework. However, we also include a discount factor (or savings)
shock orginally proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and recently utilised
e.g. by Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2010a) and Woodford (2010) to ex-
plicitly address the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) problem.
As Bils and Klenow (2008) and Christiano (2010) argued it matters whether we
cut the employers or the employees part of the labor taxes. In the latter case
the labor tax cut acts like a traditional stimulus tax cut working through the labor
supply, and, thus, wage-setting frictions under which labor supply curve is potentially
irrelevant make a di¤erence. However, in the previous case the payroll tax cut directly
a¤ects the marginal cost and, as we argue below, acts like a further destabilising
factor on the economy besides the original shock. In this paper it is the employees
part of the labor tax which is reduced.
Before we discuss the intuition of why the labor tax cut can be stimulative in
an economy consisting of both optimiser and non-optimiser households it is useful
to revise how the economy works in the ZLB. Our discussion rests on Christiano et
al. (2011). The ZLB on the nominal interest rate becomes binding due to a rise in
savings which is accomplished by a jump in the discount factor. If the shock is small
then the fall in the real interest might be enough to restore zero savings in equilibrium
before the ZLB on the nominal interest rate becomes binding in an economy without
investment. However, for a large enough shock the ZLB may become binding before
the the real rate can fall by enough to re-establish the zero-savings equilibrium.
Hence, the only way through which excess savings disappearsin equilibrium is a
large transitory decline in output. Of particular interest is the staggered price setting
channel that magnies the contraction in output. For a given drop in output there is
a fall in marginal cost which leads through the new-Keynesian Phillips curve to
a reduction in ination (and also in expected ination) which raises the real interest
rate through the Fisher relationship when nominal interest is zero. The higher is the
real interest rate the more Ricardian agents reduce their consumption. As we argue
below the introduction of wage-rigidity reduces the extent to which the staggered
price-setting channel contributes to the decline in output. In the particular case of
constant returns-to-scale technology the marginal cost equal to the real wage which
does exhibit only a mild reaction to shocks under the assumption of wage rigidity4.
4Originally the introduction of wage rigidity into the new-Keynesian model is motivated by
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As shown by Eggertsson (2010a), in an economy with only Ricardian consumers
and exible labour market, the labor tax cut makes people feel inclined to work
more and thus, labor supply shifts to the right and the partial equilibrium e¤ect
is a drop in the real wage. However, the conventional wisdom which dictates that
production increases in equilibrium after a cut in the labor tax is not valid in an
environment of zero nominal interest rates any more. In fact, when the ZLB on
nominal interest rate is binding the labor demand curve (and also the aggregate
demand curve) becomes positively sloped (see Eggertsson (2010a, 2010b)). Hence,
a positively-sloped labor demand curve implies that the rightward movement in the
labor supply is not only deationary (the decline in wage rate) but also leads to
a fall in output. The deationary e¤ect emerges from the fact that the wage tax
cut decreases the cost of labor for the rm that is willing, as a result, to lower its
product-price. However, in the presence of price-setting frictions á la Calvo (1983)
only some of the rms are able to reduce their prices and the rest maintains them
at their previous level. As a result, most of the rms will be able to cut their prices
in future periods. Therefore, the initial drop in the marginal cost has little e¤ect on
the current price level but leads to a period of falling prices in the future. Given the
fact that rms are forward-looking when maximising their current and discounted
future prot, the initial decline in the marginal cost creates deationary expectations
which, in an environment of zero nominal interest rate, leads to an increase in the
real interest rate. The rise in the real rate further depresses spending and, hence, the
marginal cost that starts another deationary cycle. In a recent study Ascari et al.
(2011) found in a model very similar to ours that the assumption of wage stickiness
implies that hours react more than wages to a change in labor demand relative to
the case of exible wages when the reverse is true.
The workings of the labor tax cut is very similar to the e¤ects of the discount
factor shock in the sense that both result in a decline of the marginal cost. However,
this paper nds that the joint presence of rule-of-thumb consumers and wage rigidity
provide rationale for labor tax cut policy. The robustness of this nding needs to
be carefully explored. Thus, our strategy is as follows. There are some additional
features popular in business cycle modelling like the inclusion of endogenous capital
and habit formation in consumption that may alter our policy conclusions. Initially,
we take a model featuring price-rigidity (and no wage rigidity) and two types of
households henceforth, referred to as Experiment 1 and show that the tax cut
reinforces the conclusions of Eggertsson (2010a) who found labor tax cuts exaggerat-
ing the e¤ects of the discount factor shock. Models used in Experiment 1-5 assume
that the tax cuts are backed by lump-sum taxes levied on Ricardian households. In
desire to reproduce the acyclicality of the real wage that is observed in time series.
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Experiment 2 we extend the previous model with wage-rigidity which is then further
augmented with habit formation in consumption in Experiment 3. The model in
Experiment 3 is enriched with capital featuring investment adjustment costs (see
Experiment 4). The section is closed with a relatively rich setup including capital
(with changing utilisation), habits and strategic complementarity in price setting
induced by Kimball (1995) demand. The last section considers whether the results
obtained from Experiments 2-5 survive if the tax cut is nanced by government debt
(instead of lump-sum taxes paid by Ricardian households) that is retired through
uniform distortionary taxation5. The validity of labor tax cut policy is explored in
each of these settings (Experiment 1-8).
Experiment 2 provides various insights. First, assuming that there is no perfect
wage-stickiness, the labor tax cut results in a rightward shift of the labor supply curve
leading to a decline in the real wage. Second, rule-of-thumb households will spend
the increase in disposable income and raise their consumption expenditures. Third,
our model economy features price stickiness and those rms that cannot charge a
higher price after the rise in demand will produce more and demand more labor. A
higher labor demand is associated with lower markups in our setup. Note that in
the model containing only one type of household exhibiting life-cycle consumption
behaviour there is no shift in the labor demand (which has positive slope in the ZLB).
Fourth, in a model without capital the payroll tax cut remains to be deationary:
the wage deation is higher than the price deation leading to a decline in the real
wage rate in accordance to the ndings of Eggertsson (2010b). But the magnitude of
the fall in the real wage is severely constrained if we introduce wage stickiness into
the model.
The extension of the baseline model with habit formation in consumption (Exper-
iment 3) does not change the picture too much. However, in a model with endogenous
capital accumulation and without habit formation in consumption (Experiment 4) we
found that that wage tax cut can happen to raise the real wage if the rightward shift
in the labor demand is big enough. The latter implies that the real wage falls by
less in case of payroll tax cut relative to the case of no policy intervention after a
discount factor shock. Hence, the labor tax cut can happen to be inationary. The
intuition for why the labor tax cut can raise the real wage in a model with capital is
as follows. In a model with capital there is an additional kick that can stimulate out-
put, namely, investment. It is well-known since at least Baxter and King (1993) that
the increase in the labor input shifts out the marginal product schedule of capital
and, thus, investment will increase in the short run. Due to the fact that capital is
5Uniform means that both types of households have to bear the burden of (distortionary) labor
taxes when debt (and the interests on it) is paid back.
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pre-determined and not reacting on impact the rental rate plummets in the short run
as a unit of capital is operating with more labor. In the long run capital rises such
that the steady-state capital:labor ratio and a corresponding rental-rate:wage-rate
ratio is maintained. We shortly note that the policy conclusion about the desirabil-
ity of tax cut policy is still maintained in Experiment 5 which contains various less
controversial features6 of business cycle modelling.
Finally, we consider a di¤erent way of nancing the labor tax cut. Utilizing the
framework of Rossi (2012) we assume that the labor tax cut is nanced by debt
which is paid back through increases in distortionary labor tax levied on both types
of households (see Experiments 6-8). Building on the insights of Bilbiie et al. (2012)
we found that the sooner the government debt is retired the higher the benets we
can associate with the labor tax cut policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 describes the agents in the
model and their assumed behaviour. Section 2 contains the calibration. In Section
3 we conduct some experiments in various settings to investigate into e¤ects of the
labor tax cut in a deterministic environment. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Ricardians
There are two types of households: Ricardians and non-Ricardians. Ricardian house-
holds are able to smooth their consumption using state-contingent assets (risk-free
bonds) while non-Ricardians cannot. The share of Ricardian and non-Ricardian
households in the economy is  and 1   , respectively. The instantenous utility
function of type i 2 fo; rg household which can be Ricardian (optimiser (OPT), o)
or non-Ricardian (or rule-of-thumb (ROT), r), is given by:
U it =
(Cit   hi Cit 1)1    1
1    
(N it )
1+'
1 + '
(1)
6Maybe one of the most controversial feature of Smets and Wouters (2007) is indexation implying
that wages and prices are changed in each period (see Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2009)) which is
not in line with micro data (see e.g. Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)).
Recently, Dixon and Le Bihan (2012) proposed generalised Taylor contracts calibrated using micro
data which can reproduce the persistent and hump-shaped impulse response of ination to a
monetary policy shock without indexation.
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where Cit ( C
i
t) denotes the time-t consumption (aggregate consumption) of type i 2
fo; rg household and parameter hi governs the degree of habit formation in consump-
tion.
First, we discuss the problem of Ricardian households. They maximise their
lifetime utility
E0
1X
t=0
tU
i
t ; (2)
where E0 is the expectation operator representing expectations conditional on period-
0 information and  is the discount factor. This maximisation of the optimiser
household is subject to a sequence of budget constraints7:
PtC
o
t+R
 1
t EtfBot+1g = (1  t)WtN ot +PtRktKot+Bot+Dot PtT ot  PtIot Ft PtSo (3)
where Pt is the aggregate price level, Wt is the nominal wage and N ot is hours worked
by OPT. Thus, WtN ot is the labor income received by the optimiser household. R
k
t
is the real rental rate on capital, Kot , in real terms and It is real investment, T
o
t
are lump-sum taxes (or transfers, if negative) paid by the household and  t is a
distortionary tax rate on labor income. Thus, RktK
o
t is the income earned on capital.
Dot are the dividends from ownership of rms. Further, B
o
t+1 is the amount of risk-free
bonds and Rt is the nominal interest rate. Following Gali et al. (2007) and Rossi
(2012) we assume, without loss of generality, that the steady-state lump sum taxes
(So) are chosen in a way that steady-state consumption of ROT and OPT households
equal in steady-state. Hence, So is a steady-state lump-sum tax used to facilitate the
equality of the steady-state consumptions of ROT and OPT households. Ft stands for
a nominal union membership fee (see later on it below). For an alternative approach
when steady-state consumptions are not equal see Natvik (2008). Also the optimiser
household takes into consideration the evolution of capital stock
Kot+1 = (1  )Kot +

1  S

Iot
Iot 1

Iot ; (4)
when choosing the level of capital optimally. In the latter equation  stands for
the depreciation rate of capital. As standard in the literature (see e.g. Smets and
Wouters (2007)) investment is subject to adjustment costs of the form, S

Iot
Iot 1

. In
general, S is chosen such that S 0(1) = 0, S 00(1) = Inv. Using investment-adjustment
costs we depart from Gali et al. (2007) who, instead, used capital adjustment costs.
7For the rest of the paper, a variable without a time subscript denotes steady-state value.
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The OPT household rst-order conditions (FOCs) with respect to consumption
(Cot ), investment (Inv
o
t ), capital (K
o
t+1) and bonds (B
o
t+1), are:
@U it
@Cit
= (Cit   hi Cit 1)  = t; with i = o; (5)
tEtt+1S
0

Invot+1
Invot

Invot+1
Invot
2
= t t

1  S

Invot
Invot 1

+tS
0

Invot
Invot 1

Invot
Invot 1
;
(6)
tEt
 
t+1R
K
t+1Ut+1   
(Ut+1) + t+1(1  )

= t; (7)
tEt

t+1
1 +Rt+1
1 + t+1

= t; (8)
where t and t are the multipliers associated with the budget constraint (equation
(3)) and with the evolution of capital (equation (4)) in the Lagrangean representation
of the OPT households problem. Also let us dene Tobins Q as Qt  t=t. Here

(Ut) is the storage cost of the part of capital that is not utilised for production
at time t.The equations above can be described as follows. Equations (5), (6), (7)
and (8) dene, respectively, the marginal utility of consumption, the evolution of
Tobins Q, the capital Euler equation and the bond Euler equation. In all the above
equations that contain expectations we ignore covariance terms.
The linearised8 version of equation (8) is the intertemporal Euler equation:
cot =
ho
1 + ho
cot 1 +
1
1 + ho
Etc
o
t+1  
1  ho
1 + ho


[dRt   Ett+1   drt]; (9)
where cot  log(Cot =C), t  log(Pt=Pt 1) is the time-t rate of ination, dRt  Rt R
(drt  Rrealt  Rreal), i.e. the deviation of nominal (real) interest rate from its steady-
state value. drt can also be interpreted as the discount factor shock9. Notice that
ho = 0 delivers the usual Euler equation without habit formation.
8The fact that Eggertsson (2010) log-linearise while Christiano (2010) linearise the same model
does not a¤ect the main conclusions. Here we follow the latter strategy.
9Following the appendix of Christiano (2010) the time varying discount factor is made equal to
the inverse of the real interest rate (Rrealt ) :
t =
1
1 +Rrealt
which can be linearised as:
^t =  
1
(1 + r)2
drt;
where ^t  (t   )= and drt  Rrealt   Rreal. It follows by using the steady-state condition
8
The combination of equation (7) and the denition of Tobins Q results, after
linearisation, in the following expression10:
qt = (1  )Etqt+1 + (1  (1  ))Etrkt+1   (dRt   drt); (10)
where qt  log(Qt=Q), kt  log(Kt=K) and rkt  log(Rkt =Rk). It is instructive to
observe that the discount factor shock (drt) appears in the capital-Euler equation
(10) as well causing a decline in Tobins q when drt < 0.
Similarly, the substitution of the denition of Tobins Q into equation (6) leads
to a dynamic relationship between investment and the implicit price of capital (i.e.
Tobins Q) which can be linearised to yield:
invt =
1
1 + 
invt 1 +

1 + 
Etinvt+1 +
1
Inv(1 + )
qt; (11)
where invt  log(Invt=Inv).
Also the linear version of the evolution of capital in equation (4) can be written
as:
kt+1 = invt   (1  )kt: (12)
The linearised equilibrium condition describing the relationship between the rental
rate and capital utilisation is:
rkt =

00(U)

0(U) ut = 
uut:
Following Christiano et al. (2005) we assume that the capital utilisation in steady-
state is Ut = U = 1 and 
(1) = 0, 
0(1) > 0 and 
00(1) > 0. The labor supply of
OPT household is determined by the unions problem (discussed below).
2.1.2 Non-Ricardians
Non-Ricardian households cannot invest either into physical capital or into bonds.
In other words, they are excluded from nancial and capital markets. Hence, this
 = 1=(1 +Rreal) = 1=(1 +R) that:
^t = drt:
10Here we depart from Gali et al. (2007) by assuming investment adjustment costs instead of
their capital adjustment costs. Investment adjustment costs are more plausible empirically and
widely used in middle-sized DSGE models like the Smets-Wouters (2007) model.
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is the case of limited asset market participation. Therefore, ROT do not make
consumption-savings decision (i.e. the lack of consumption Euler equation). ROT
householdsconsumption depends on their disposable income i.e. the labor income
after taxation, (1   t)WtN rt  which is reected by their budget constraint:Z 1
0
Pt(i)C
r
t (i)di = (1   t)WtN rt   PtSr; (13)
where Crt (i) and N
r
t are, respectively, the consumption of product i and hours worked
by rule-of-thumb households. The lump-sum tax, Sr, ensures that the steady-state
consumption of each types of households coincide. ROT agents exploit relative price
di¤erences in the construction of their consumption basket and, in optimum, they
obtain:
PtC
r
t =
Z 1
0
Pt(i)C
r
t (i)di:
Thus, a ROT household maximises its utility (equation (2) with i = r) with
respect to its budget constraint (equation (13)).
The budget constraint of ROT households in equation (13) can be expressed in
linear form as:
crt = wt + n
r
t   ^ t;
where ^ t   t  ,   1=(1 ). Note that in the case of log utility in consumption
which is our baseline calibration, see below and in the absence of time-varying
transfer payments (or lump-sum taxes) in the budget constraint of ROT hours worked
for ROT household is constant and nrt = 0 (for such a conguration see Ascari et al.
(2011))
ROT households delegate their labor supply decision to unions (see next section).
2.2 Unions
To introduce wage stickiness into the model one usually assumes that households have
monopoly power in determining their wage as in Erceg et al. (2001) who presume
that each household can engage in perfect consumption smoothing. However, the
presence of ROT households who cannot engage in intertemporal trade precludes
the possibility of consumption smoothing. To motive a wage-setting decision we
suppose following Gali et al. (2007) and Furlanetto and Seneca (2009) that there
are a continuum of unions (on the unit interval), z 2 [0; 1], each representing a
continuum of workers of which a fraction () are members of rule-of-thumb and the
remaining (1 ) fraction consists of optimising households. Each union employs one
10
particular type of labor (independently of the type households they originate from)
that is di¤erent from the type of labor o¤ered by other unions. The labor services
supplied by each union is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of the memberslabor services:
Nt(z) =
Z 1
0
[Nt(z; i)]
"w
"w 1di
 "w 1
"w
;
where "w is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent types of households.
Each period the union maximises the weighted current and discounted future
utility of its members:
Et
1X
T=0
t+T

U rt+T + (1  )U ot+T

subject to the labor demand function for labor of type z:
Nt(z) =

Wt(z)
Wt
 "w
Nt
where Wt(z) is the nominal wage set by the union z and "w is the elasticity of labor
demand. We follow Furlanetto (2011) in assuming that wage adjustments are costly
and evolve similarly to Rotemberg (1982) who originally applied it to model price
adjustment. In particular, there is a wage adjustment cost which is a quadratic
function of the change in the nominal wage and proportional to the aggregate wage
bill. The presence of this wage adjustment cost is justied by the fact that unions
have to negotiate wages each period and this activity consumes real resources. The
larger is the increase in nominal wage achieved by the union the higher is the e¤ort
associated with it. Each union members incurs an equal share of the wage adjustment
cost. Thus, the nominal membership fee, F paid by a generic union member z at
time t is given by:
Ft(z) =
w
2

Wt(z)
Wt 1(z)
  1
2
WtNt
where w governs the size of the adjustment costs. In the special case of w = 0 the
model coincides with the one in Gali et al. (2007).
The rst-order condition associated with the unions problem is the same as the
one in Furlanetto (2011):
0 =


@U rt
@Crt
+ (1  )@U
o
t
@Cot

(1   t) ~Wt[("w   1) + w(wt   1)wt ]  "wN't
 


@U rt+1
@Crt+1
+ (1  )@U
o
t+1
@Cot+1

w(
w
t+1   1)wt+1
Wt+1
Pt+1
Nt+1
Nt
; (14)
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where wt  Wt=Wt 1 is the wage ination, ~Wt  Wt=Pt is the real wage and @U
i
t
@Cit
is
dened by equation (5) for i 2 fo; rg. The consumption di¤ers between the two types
of consumers. When making a decision on labor demand the rm does not distinguish
between di¤erent workers of type z. Thus, in the aggregate, N rt = N
o
t = Nt holds
i.e. they work the same amount of hours. The linearisation of equation (14) yields
what we call the new-Keynesian wage Phillips curve:
w;t = Etw;t+1   w [wt  mrst   ^ t] ; (15)
where w;t  log(wt =w), wt  log( ~Wt= ~W ), ^ t   t    , w  "w 1w
11 and the
linearised expression for the marginal rate of substitution is12:
mrst = r(c
r
t   hrcrt 1) + o(cot   hocot 1) + 'nt; (16)
where
r  

1  hr
(1  ho)
(1  ho) + (1  )(1  hr) ;
o  
1  
1  ho
(1  hr)
(1  ho) + (1  )(1  hr) :
Note that in case of ho = hr = 0 equation (16) boils down to the case of CRRA
utility without habits. Without loss of generality we assume following Furlanetto
and Seneca (2011) that hr = 0 and ho > 0. The connection between the wage
ination (w;t), price ination (t) and the real wage (wt) can be expressed, in linear
form, as:
w;t = wt   wt 1 + t: (17)
2.3 Firms
The intermediary goods are produced by monopolistically competitive rms of which
a randomly selected 1   p fraction is able to set an optimal price each period as
in Calvo (1983) while the remaining p fraction keep their price xed. Intermediary
good z, denoted as Y (z), is produced by a constant returns-to-scale Cobb Douglas
technology:
Yt(z) = [UtKt 1(z)] [Nt(z)]1  ; (18)
11In calculating the value of w we use (1 
w)(1 w)
w
1
1+' "w"w 1
which results in case of Calvo wage
setting and equivalent to "w 1w that we obtain under Rotemberg wage setting.
12Note that we assume a tax policy that equates steady-state consumptions across household
types (i.e., Cr = Co).
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where Kt is capital, Nt is hours worked and Ut is the degree of capital utilisation.
There is a competitive rm which bundles intermediate goods into a single nal
good through the Kimball (1995) aggregator:Z 1
0
G(Xt(z))dz = 1; (19)
where Xt(z)  Yt(z)=Yt is the relative demand and G is a function with properties
G(1) = 1, G 0 > 0 and G 00 < 0.
The prot maximisation problem of the perfectly competitive goods bundler gives
way to the relative demand for the product of rm z:
Xt(z) = ~G

Pt(z)Yt
vt

(20)
where ~G  G 0 1(:) and vt is multiplier of the constraint in the Lagrangean represen-
tation of this maximisation problem.
The price deator can be implicitly dened by
PtYt =
Z 1
0
Pt(z)Yt(z)dz
and
vt = PtYt
Z 1
0
G 0 (Xt(z))Xt(z)dz
 1
:
Let us dene the price elasticity of demand by
(Xt(z))    G
0(Xt(z))
G 00(Xt(z))Xt(z) :
In the special case when
G(Xt(z)) = [Xt(z)]
"p 1
"p ;
equation (19) boils down to the usual Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator which implies constant
elasticity of substitution: (Xt(z)) = "p for all Xt(z) (Woodford (2003)). In the
standard Dixit-Stiglitz case the demand function can be written as
Xt(z) =

Pt(z)
Pt
 "p
;
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where the price index is dened as:
Pt 
Z 1
0
[Pt(z)]
1 "p dz
1=(1 "p)
:
In the general Kimball case the own price elasticity of the elasticity of demand
can be dened as
(Xt(z))  @(Xt(z))
@Pt(z)
Pt(z)
(Xt(z))
;
where in steady-state (1) =  > 0 i.e. the elasticity declines if the rm sells more
or, equivalently, elasticity is increasing in the price (Furlanetto and Seneca (2009)).
Intermediary rm z that last reset its price at time T = 0 maximises its present
and discounted future prots with the probability of not resetting its price:
max
pt
1X
T=0
(p)T t;t+T

pt+T (z)Yt+T (z)  TC (Yt+T (z))

;
where pt is the optimal reset price at time t, p is the probability of not resetting
the price, TC stands for the total cost of production and t;t+T is the stochastic
discount factor dened as:
t;t+T  

Cot   hoCot 1
Cot+T   hoCot+T 1

Pt
Pt+T
:
This rms maximisation problem is subject to the production function in equation
(18) and to the demand function of good z in equation 20.
The rst order condition with respect to pt (z) is given by:
1X
T=0
(p)T Et

t;t+TYt+T (z)

pt (1  (Xt(z)))  (Xt(z))Pt+TStjt+T (z)
	
; (21)
where Stjt+T (z) is the time t + T real marginal cost of rm z that last changed its
price at time t.
The cost minimisation problem of the intermediary yields the demand for labor,
the demand for capital and the marginal cost respectively:
Wt(z) = St(z)(1  ) Yt(z)
Nt(z)
; (22)
Rkt (z) = St(z)
Yt(z)
UtKt 1(z) ; (23)
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St(z) = 
 (1  ) (1 ) Rkt (z) [W (z)]1 ;
which, after imposing symmetric equilibrium, can be expressed in their linear form,
respectively, as:
wt = st + yt   nt;
rkt = st + yt   kt 1   ut;
st = r
k
t + (1  )wt;
where st stands for the average real marginal cost.
The evolution of the aggregate price level in the Calvo model is given by:
Pt 
h
(1  p) (pt )1 "p + pP 1 "pt 1
i1=(1 "p)
:
The loglinear version of equation (21) is the so-called new-Keynesian price Phillips
curve:
t = Ett+1 + st; (24)
where
  (1  
p)(1  p)
p
1
1 + I 
1 "p
; (25)
where I is an indicator variable that can take on the value of one or zero. When
I = 1 the model contains real rigidity in the form of Kimball (1995) demand. In
Experiment one (see below) which utilises the above model without wage stickiness,
habit formation and endogenous capital accumulation real rigidity is necessary be-
cause it helps to avoid a non-uniqueness problem (for more on this see footnote (21)).
Experiment ve which contains a model with capital also employs Kimball prefer-
ences. In the robustness analysis section we further elaborate on the importance of
strategic complementarity13.
2.4 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
2.4.1 Fiscal policy
Similarly to Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) we consider a determin-
istic experiment: the tax rate is cut with the same amount in each period for the
entire duration of the shock. There are at least two ways to nance the cut in the
labor tax rate. The rst scenario is the simplest one possible: the payroll tax cut is
13See also Kaszab (2011) who found that strategic complementarity can change the magnitude
of scal multipliers.
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nanced by lump-sum taxes levied on Ricardian consumers. In the second case the
same tax cut is nanced by government debt that is paid back through distortionary
taxes that are levied on both types of households (uniform taxation).
In the experiments with distortionary taxation (see below) we assume in contrast
to Gali et al. (2007) and in accordance to Rossi (2012) that the steady-state level
of debt is not zero and public debt is allowed to uctuate along the business cycle.
The government budget constraint which implicitly describes the evolution of debt
reads as:
R 1t Bt+1 + Pt tYt = Bt + PtGt
which gives way after linearisation to:
bt+1 = dRt +
1


bt   t   
b
(yt +
1

^ t) +
1
b
gt

; (26)
where b is the ratio of debt to GDP and the debt is dened as: bt  (Bt   B)=B,
gt  (Gt   G)=Y and Bt is in real terms. ^ t is dened earlier. For the rest of the
paper we set gt = 0, 8t.
Rossi (2012) proposes the following government revenue rule based on Leeper
(1991):
Yt t = 0 + 1
Y
b
(bt   b) + 2(Yt   Y );
where 0 > 0. As in Leeper (1991) and Rossi (2012) there is no restriction on the
values of 1 and 2. We refer to 2 > 0 (2 < 0) as procyclical (countercyclical) scal
policy. The latter revenue rule can be linearised to yield:
^ t = 1bt + (2   1)yt: (27)
Coe¢ cient 1 governs the response of taxes to debt. The higher 1 is the more
government relies on decit nancing and the further we are from balanced budget
which is a very strict and empirically questionable feature.
Based on Leeper (1991) and Rossi (2012) we note that determinacy is guaranteed
by an active (passive) monetary policy,  > 1 and a passive (active) scal policy,
1 >

1

  1

,

1 <

1

  1

in the standard case when a Taylor rule is in oper-
ation. The determinacy properties of the equilibrium under a rule like in equation
(27) in the ZLB is subject to future research.
2.4.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is described by the rule in Christiano et al. (2011):
Rt = max(Zt; 0) (28)
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where
Zt = (1=)(1 + t)
1(1 R)(Yt=Y )2(1 R)[(1 +Rt 1)]R   1; (29)
where Zt is the shadow nominal interest rate which can take on negative values as
well. As usual, we assume that 1 > 1, 2 2 [0; 1) and 0 < R < 1. 1 controls
how strongly monetary policy reacts to changes in ination while 2 governs the
strength of the response of nominal interest to changes in output-gap14. The main
implication of the rule in equation (28) is that whenever the nominal interest rate
becomes negative, the monetary policy set it equal to zero, otherwise it is set by
the Taylor rule specied in equation (29). The parameter R measures how quickly
monetary policy reacts to changes in ination and output-gap. Furthermore, ination
in steady-state is assumed to be zero which implies that steady-state net nominal
interest rate is 1=   1.
The monetary policy rule above can be written, in linear form, as:
dRt =
dZt; dZt    1   1 , zero bound not binding
 

1

  1

; otherwise, zero bound binding
;
dZt = RdRt 1 + (1  R)
1

[1t + 2yt] :
Hence, the ZLB on the nominal interest binds when dRt =  

1

  1

. Otherwise,
we set dRt = dZt.
2.5 Aggregation, Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The aggregate consumption and hours worked is a composite of those of the two
types of households:
Ct = C
r
t + (1  )Cot ;
Nt = N
r
t + (1  )N ot :
The aggregate capital, investment and dividend payments is determined by Kt =
(1  )Kot , Invt = (1  )Invot and Dt = (1  )Dot .
The aggregation equation with the assumption of consumption and hours of dif-
ferent types of households are equal in steady-state:
ct = c
r
t + (1  )cot ;
14Precisely, the term Yt=Y does not stand for the output gap as the denition of the output gap
contains the deviation of the actual GDP from its exible price level equivalent. Here we simply
use the deviation of output from its steady-state value.
17
nt = n
r
t + (1  )not ;
which we obtained by setting steady-state consumption and hours worked of each
type equal in steady-state (Cr = Co and N r = N o) using a lump-sum tax (see the
previous discussion in the section describing Ricardian households).
In the absence of lump-sum taxes in the budget constraint of the ROT household
and assuming log utility in consumption ( = 1) the hours worked by ROT household
is constant and, thus, nrt = 0.
The goods market clearing is
Yt = Ct + Invt +Gt + 
(Ut)Kt 1;
which can be expressed in linear form as
yt = cct + iinvt + gt + kR
kut;
where for the rest of the paper we set gt = 0 and c is calculated as described in
Appendix B of Gali et al. (2007):
c = 1  i   g = 1 

(Y=K)
  g = 1 

p(+ )
  g;
where c  C=Y , i  I=Y , g  G=Y , k  K=Y and the last equality made use
of the fact that in steady-state Rk = Y=pK = =(k
p) which assumes that the
steady-state marginal cost is constant and equal to the inverse of the markup dened
as p  "p=("p   1). The steady-state rental rate is Rk = +  with    1   1.
After having outlayed the building blocks we are ready to dene equilibrium of
this model. The equilibrium is characterised by a sequence of endogenous quantities
fKt; N ot ; N rt ; Nt; Cot ; Crt ; Ct; Invt;Ut; Yt; Btg1t=0;
price sequences
fQt;t;wt ; Rkt ;Wt; St; Rt; Ztg1t=0;
and a given set of exogenous deterministic shocks
fRrealt ;  tg1t=0
and initial values for the state variables (capital and debt) that satisfy equilibrium
conditions of the household, rms, unions, government and monetary authority such
that markets clear, the transversality conditions for the endogenous states are im-
posed and the aggregate resource constraint is also satised.
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3 Calibration
Households. The discount factor, , is equal to 0:99 implying a real annual interest
rate of 4%. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , is set to one implying
log utility which is usual in the literature. Following Christiano (2010 and see the
references therein) the parameter governing the disutility of labor, ' is chosen to be
one (i.e. Frisch elasticity of labor supply, 1=', is also one) which is more conservative
than the value of 0:2 used by Gali et al. (2007). Also, similarly to Christiano
(2010) we use "p = "w = 6. The steady-state consumption-income ratio, c, is
0.75. Campbell and Mankiw (1991) estimate the share of rule-of-thumb consumers
() to be 35% while Fuhrer (2000) nds values of 26% and 29% depending on the
econometric method he uses. Averaging the nding of the previous studies we set
 = 0:3 which we think is more plausible empirically than the 0:5 used by Gali et al.
(2007).
Monetary Policy. The ination coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule, 1, is 2. Following
Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) there is neither interest-rate smooting
(R = 0) nor response to output gap in the Taylor rule (2 = 0).
Fiscal Policy and Experiments. The debt-GDP ratio, b is 2.4 implying an annual
steady-state ratio of public debt to output of 60% (see Rossi (2012) for this choice).
In the simulations below 1 can be either high (0.9) or low (0.1) depending on what
we assume about the time horizon of debt repayment (see more on this below).
This paper consider countercyclical scal policy and sets 2 = 0:5 which ensures
determinacy of the equilibrium15 and implies a mild tax response of tax rate to
changes in output. The steady-state labor tax rate () is chosen to be 30% as in
Christiano (2010). Although the size of the discount factor shock, rt, varies somewhat
across simulations (see below) it is always close to the mode of -0.0104 estimated by
Denes and Eggertsson (2010) using a modell that contains only price rigidity and
specic labor market. The duration of the shock is 10 periods16 which is in accordance
with the modal estimate of Denes and Eggertsson (2009).
Firms. The benchmark value of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) for

u is 0:01. The depreciation rate of capital is also a standard choice: 0:025 at a
quarterly rate. The mean posterior estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007) for the
15In general, we found that the calibration 0 < 2 < 1 result in a determinate and unique of the
equilibrium. Also see Rossi (2012) for more on the issue of how scal rules a¤ect the determinacy
properties of the equilibrium in a model with ROT and OPT households.
16Eggertsson (2010) and Denes Eggertsson (2009) consider a stochastic experiment with a persis-
tence estimate of  = 0:9030 for the shock process. This  is easily translated into our deterministic
experiment knowing that the average duration of this AR(1) is 1=(1  ) which is roughly 10. For
a similar argument see Appendix C of Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2012).
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Calvo parameters, p = 0:66 (w = 0:7) imply an average price (wage) stickiness of
around two (three) quarters. The reduced form estimates (see for references Furlan-
etto and Seneca (2009)) on the new-Keynesian price Phillips curve imply  = 0:03.
Without real rigidity such a value of  would imply a very long-period of price inertia
(p = 0:85). In our baseline calibration without real rigidity (i.e. I = 0) p = 0:66
implies  = :1786. When I = 1 the calibration of  = 0:03 is achieved by setting
an appropriate value for . The implied value of  is 24.77 which is in the range of
empirical estimates listed in Furlanetto and Seneca (2009).
4 Experiments
Our experiments are in the spirit of Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011)17
who assumed that the discount factor shock and the corresponding scal policy shock
is on for a deterministic period of time. The deterministic simulations are executed
using the codes of Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011)18. In particular,
their codes implement a standard shooting algorithm to handle the ZLB problem.
The details of this algorithm are available in the appendix of Christiano (2010). Also,
Sargent and Ljunquist (2003) explain in a simple model how the shooting algorithm
works. The algorithm is designed such that variables in the model hit their long-
run steady-state values at a specic future date. Thus, we are looking for an initial
value(s) of the endogenous state(s) which makes it possible for all variables to reach
their target values at a particular future date in a way that equilibrium conditions
are met each period.
4.1 Tax cut is nanced by lump-sum taxes
In the rst experiment we assume that there are neither endogenous capital (i.e.
equations (10), (11) and (12) are eliminated) nor wage stickiness in the economy
i.e. W = 0 in the wage Phillips curve in equation (15). The zero lower bound
experiment is very similar to the one conducted in Christiano (2010). A discount
17Note that section 2 and 3 of Christiano et al. (2011) consider a stochastic experiment similar
to those in Eggertsson (2010) and Woodford (2010) while section 4 and 5 consider deterministic
experiments that are accomplished by using a standard shooting algorithm. In case of only price
rigidity (or only wage riditiy) the system can be re-written using the Eggertsson-Woodford (2003)
type of methodology applicable if the system contains no state variable. The latter is not true
any more in case of the inclusion of both price and wage stickiness when one of the variables
(potentially the real wage) becomes an endogenous state. Hence, we make use of the shooting
algorithm of Christiano (2010).
18The codes are available from Lawrence Christianos website.
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factor shock hits the economy in period one. The model is in deterministic steady-
state until t = 1. At t = 1 the discount rate drops from its steady-state value of 0.01
(per quarter) to r =  0:01 and remains low for T = 10 quarters19. From quarter
11 (T + 1) on the discount rate is back to its steady-state value. Note that all the
deterministic experiments below assume that the discount factor shock is on for ten
periods although its size slightly varies across them. Regarding how the tax cut is
nanced let us consider the simplest possible scal arrangement: the wage tax cut
is backed by current and future rise in lump-sum taxes paid by Ricardian agents.
Thus, in experiment 1-5 the government budget constraint (equation 26) and the tax
rule (equation 27) are not included among the equilibrium conditions.
The steady-state level of labor tax is 30 per cent. In the no policy response
simulation the labor tax rate is at its steady-state level for the entire simulation. In
the alternative simulation (denoted with dashed line) the labor tax rate is decreased
(in contrast to Christiano (2010) and Christiano et al. (2011) who considered a rise
in the tax rate) to  = 0:2 for the time period in which the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate is binding. The problem is solved using the code of Christiano
et al. (2010) that determines endogenously the date at which the zero lower bound
becomes binding and the date at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind.
Figure 1 shows20 the rst experiment featuring a model that includes two types
of households and price rigidity. Wage rigidity, capital and habits are excluded from
the model of this experiment21. In the absence of tax policy the ZLB ends in period
6 while the presence of tax policy makes the ZLB bind for 9 periods.
The tax cut magnies the deationary e¤ects described by Eggertsson (2010a):
19For comparison, Christiano (2010) considered a shock of similar size although a somewhat
longer period (T = 15).
20Consumption (both ROT and OPT), hours, output, investment, real wage rate are expressed
as percentage deviation from their steady-state values (on the graphs it is indicated as "% deviation
from ss") while price ination, wage ination, shadow interest rate, nominal and real interest rate
is express az annual percentage rate (APR).
21In this experiment we found numerically that there are two solutions to the shooting problem
( hence no unique solution). Also we realised that the drop in output and ination is extremely
large in this simplest variant of model (without capital, habits and wage rigidity) containing two
types of households. The indeterminacy problem in the baseline Gali et al. (2007) model for even
empirically reasonable calibrations is well-known in the literature. The zero-lower bound channel
adds some further complication, namely, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate has to
be binding. To avoid the non-uniqueness problem and to reduce the extreme negative impact of
the shock we introduce strategic complementarity into price setting in the way discussed above. As
Ascari et al. (2011) argues the uniqueness problem is mitigated by the inclusion of wage rigidity
into the baseline model. Thus, in the models containing wage rigidity we do not encounter such
non-uniqueness problem.
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the price deation and the contraction in hours are more severe with the tax cut.
Also note that the drop in real wage which equals to the marginal cost due to
constant returns assumption is considerable. The consumption falls for both types
of households. Hence, the wage tax cut does not alleviate the negative consequences
of the savings shock (huge deation and fall in output). In fact, the labor tax cut
makes the zero lower bound even more binding. When zero lower bound ceases
to bind the Taylor rule becomes operational again and monetary policy reacts to
expansionary scal policy (i.e. the labor tax cut) by raising the nominal interest
rate. Hence, there is a large upward movement in nominal interest following the zero
lower bound period.
Figure 2 shows an experiment similar to the rst one but this time we introduce
wage stickiness into the model (second experiment). The discount rate is set to
 0:02 per quarter. The ZLB binds for period 1 to 6 (7) without (with) policy. Wages
are set by unions and assumed to remain xed for about 3 quarters. Again we operate
with a simple scal scenario: the wage tax cut is backed by current and future rise in
lump-sum taxes paid by Ricardian agents. In this particular case OPT internalise the
government budget constraint. The wage tax cut increases the disposable income of
ROT households who consume it. In the absence of policy change the real wage does
not fall dramatically due to the presence of wage stickiness in sharp contrast to the
previous experiment. But still the tax cut remains deationary (as the labor supply
shifts to the right) and the real wage in the case of tax policy falls more than without
policy. Observing the graphs we can also see that the wage deation is higher than
the price deation implying a fall in the real wage rate. With perfect wage-stickiness
(w is close to one) which is not the case here but serves as a useful abstraction
(see e.g. the argument of Christiano (2010)) the labor supply would remain inact.
In the next we analyse the indirect reaction of labor demand to the tax cut. Before
that, mention must be made of the slope of labor demand that turns from negative to
positive in ZLB environment. Following Eggertsson (2010a, 2010b) who, di¤erently
from us, considered a stochastic experiment we show that the combination of the
new-Keynesian price Phillips curve, the production function and the Euler equation
results in a positive relationship between the real wage and hours worked.
The higher consumption demand of non-Ricardian agents induces many of the
rms which cannot charge a higher price due to price stickiness to increase their
production. To produce more rms demand more labor i.e. the labor demand shifts
out. As it is well-known in sticky-price models a rise in aggregate demand due
to the higher consumption expenditures of ROT households leads to a fall in the
markup, which induces an outward shift in the labor demand. Below we argue that
the higher labor demand is supported by an increase in labor supply when wages are
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sticky.
Our setup features a negative preference shock that causes deation and output
loss. Without tax policy the labor demand shifts to the left leading to a decrease
in the real wage. The wage tax cut can mitigate this e¤ect by boosting aggregate
demand (and labor demand) under sticky prices through the increase in consumption
of non-Ricardian consumers.
Let us discuss what happens to wages and hours after an increase in labor demand
(induced by a fall in the markup) when nominal wages are rigid. Ascari et al. (2011)
present a graph (see the left-hand side graph on gure 3) indicating that the slope of
the wage schedule22 in the sticky wages case is atter than the one in the exible wage
case. In the exible wages case the real wage increases a lot in response to a rise in
aggregate demand and hours change only to small extent. Therefore, under exible
wages, there is scope for a negative income e¤ect through a decrease in prots23 to
emerge if labor supply is inelastic (i.e. the change in hours is small)24. This negative
income e¤ect translates into a leftward shift in the labor demand depressing the wage
for both positive and zero interest rates. Furthermore, Bilbiie et al. (2012) argue
that this negative income e¤ect ensures that the labor supply of OPT increases more
than the amount by which the labor supply of ROT decreases25. Thus, the rise in
labor demand is supported by an increase in aggregate labor supply.
But this is not the case anymore for sticky wages when it is hours worked that
respond more after a surge in demand and the real wage changes to small extent (see
the right-hand side graph on gure 3). In Experiment 2 wage deation is always more
negative than price deation leading to an increase in the prots of OPT households
for given hours. However, this positive income e¤ect is still not enough for OPT
households to generate a rise in consumption (see element (1,2) of gure 2 where
ROT consumption in case of tax cut policy coincides with those without policy).
This can be explained by the behaviour of OPT households who are assumed to bear
the whole burden of the tax cut bringing about a negative wealth e¤ect that decrease
22The wage schedule is derived from the wage Phillips curve assuming, for the sake of a com-
parative static exercise the outward shift in the labor demand that forward-looking terms are
constant.
23When the share of ROT agents are high (i.e.  is big) a unit fall in prot results in a decline of
dividens that is bigger than one as OPT households receive 1=(1  ) share of the dividens (Bilbiie
(2008)).
24As Ascari et al. (2011), Bilbiie (2008), Bilbiie et al. (2012) and Rossi (2012) argue there in a
negative income e¤ect that has to be accounted for in the presence of heterogenous households and
exible labor market. Namely, after a positive demand shock the wage ination is always higher
than the price ination which leads to a fall in prot income after a positive demand shock on
condition that labor supply is inelastic (i.e. the change in hours is small enough).
25The labor supply of ROT falls because of the positive income e¤ect of the tax cut.
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their total discounted life-time consumption. Due to this huge negative wealth e¤ect
it remains to be true that labor supply of OPT rises by more than the amount by
which labor supply of ROT decreases and, thus, the total hours worked can rise too.
Thus, in this experiment, the recession is mitigated by means of labor tax policy (see
the dashed line on the graph depicting hours that falls by less in case of a labor tax
cut policy). Let us explore whether this result stays robust if we add habit formation
to the model.
The third experiment shown on Figure 4 makes use of the model in the previous
simulation but now it includes external habit formation in consumption as well. Due
to the lagged consumption term habit formation injects some endogenous persistence
into the model and leads to hump-shaped impulse responses in OPT consumption and
hours. Habit formation is a well-known feature of middle-sized DSGE models like the
one of Smets and Wouters (2007) and is found useful in matching the empirical VAR
evidence. Also habit formation is usually regarded to have some solid psychological
foundation. Our baseline calibration assumes that only OPT households feature
habit formation in consumption although our results remain still valid in the case
when it it also ROT households who care about their past consumption (the graph of
this experiment is not reported here). The presence of habits mitigates the negative
e¤ects of the shock. This can be explained as follows. As argued above it is the
rise in the real interest that makes people delay their consumption expenditure. The
introduction of habits reduces the sensitivity of consumption to changes in the real
interest (this can be quickly veried by looking at equation (9) where the coe¢ cient
on the interest is smaller in case of habits [1 ho
1+ho


] than it is for the standard CRRA
case [=]). To generate a fall in variables of magnitude similar to the those in the
previous experiments we consider a somewhat bigger drop in the discount factor (-
0.03). The ZLB binds from period 1 to 8 (10) without (with) policy. Still output
(hours) declines less when labor tax cut policy is applied.
In the fourth experiment on gure 5 we add endogenous capital accumulation
preserving all the other previous properties but abstracting from habit formation.
Here we set the size of the discount factor shock to -0.015. The ZLB ceases to bind
with (without) policy in periods 1 to 8 (7). Again output, consumption and hours
fall less when there is a cut in the labor tax. Now there is one more channel, notably
investment, that supports the favorable e¤ect of tax decrease beyond the positive
response of ROT consumption. However, the positive e¤ects of the tax cut on in-
vestment are less apparent in the short-run because of the investment adjustment
costs. As Monacelli and Perotti (2008) argues the investment is inertial in the short
run i.e. it exhibits no response at the beginning and builds up only gradually. The
most interesting feature of this experiment the wage deation under the labor tax
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cut smaller than it is in case of no policy. Hence, the real wage (and also the rental
rate on capital) can increase to some extent after the labor tax cut (in other words,
it falls by less under the wage tax cut policy scenario relative to the case of no policy
change). This nding appears to be quite counterintuitive at the rst sight and can
be explained as follows. As argued previously the labor tax cut results in a rise in
hours worked which shifts out the marginal product of capital and leads to higher
investment (which is muted by investment adjustment costs). Being predetermined
the capital remains xed at the beginning and builds up gradually so that the equi-
librium capital:labor ratio remains to be satised in the long-run. This additional
surge in investment might be enough to generate a labor demand shift that nally
leads to a rise in the real wage.
In the fth experiment on gure 6 we consider the setup in the fourth experi-
ment with external habit formation, capital utilisation26 and real rigidity induced by
Kimball-demand setting I = 1 in expression (25). Several things are interesting in
this graph. Note that the real wage cannot increase (or fall by less) in case of the
tax cut policy anymore in this setting due to the presence of habit formation that
slows down the reaction of consumption. In particular, the consumption of ROT con-
sumers declines to higher extent in case of habit formation and the rightward shift
in the labor demand is limited. As a result, the real wage cannot increase and the
nding of Experiment 2-3 is reconrmed. In the next we conduct some robustness
checks.
Robustness Analysis
It is instructive to ask how robust our results are to a i) change in the coe¢ cient
of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) or to a ii) change in the elasticity
of the labor supply or to the iii) higher strategic complementarity in price-setting
or iv) to the size of the discount factor shock. All sensitivity checks are conducted
by using the model in Experiment 5. Corresponding graphs are not reported in the
paper but available on request.
Let us rst consider that the coe¢ cient of IES rises from  = 1 (the case of
log-utility) to  = 1:5. It is well-known in economics theory that for a utility that
is separable in consumption and leisure like the one here given by equation (1)
with hi = 0 the coe¢ cient of  higher than one implies that an increase in the
real wage has an income e¤ect which is stronger than the substitution e¤ect (see
e.g. Mankiw and Weinzierl (2012) whose calibration is  > 1). For  = 1 the
26By employing capital utilisation we can mute the negative wealth e¤ect of the labor tax cut on
OPT households. As a result consumption and output will fall by less.
25
income and substitution e¤ects o¤set each other. Due to the tax cut both types
of households receive more money after each hour worked and they are willing to
increase their labor supply (substitution e¤ect). At the same time agents realise
that their after-tax income is higher and happy to consume more and are also eager
to enjoy some more leisure time (income e¤ect). Also with a coe¢ cient of IES
di¤erent from one the labor supply of the ROT is not constant any more27. OPT
households consider, however, their total discounted value of their life-time wealth
when choosing their consumption path. They interpret the temporary tax cut as
future rise in taxes and not do not feel inclined to consume more. When  > 1 both
types of agents feel wealthier and willing to raise their expenditures. Thus, it follows
that the consumption of OPT (in case of  > 1) falls to a smaller extent while it
rises a bit more for ROT. Consequently, the aggregate consumption falls by less. The
labor tax cut remains to be an e¤ective tool in alleviating the negative e¤ects of the
shock.
Next we investigate into the e¤ects of an increase in labor supply elasticity (i.e. a
fall in '). As Bilbiie (2008) shows hours and consumption of ROT respond more to
changes in real wage if ' is smaller. Let us set ' = 0:2 which is the one considered
by Gali et al. (2007). In particular, the more elastic labor supply is the more
consumption and hours increase in reaction to a change in real wage. Thus, a rise in
labor supply elasticity has e¤ects similar to the case of less wage rigidity. As argued
previously the more exible are wages or the more elastic is the labor supply the
higher is the fall in output and the larger are the wage and price deation in the ZLB.
Hence, the bigger is the fall in the real wage the less ROT consumption increases after
the wage tax cut. Despite all these e¤ects the reaction of output remains similar to
that with the baseline calibration because investment adjusts in a way that it makes
up for the bigger loss in ROT consumption due to higher labor supply elasticity.
As argued by Woodford (2003) the introduction of some real rigidity like specic
capital (or labor) market or Kimball demand induces price-setting decisions of rms
to be strategic complementaries i.e. rms change prices similarly in reaction to ex-
ogenous shocks. Using the model in experiment 5 we investigate into the e¤ects of
increasing strategic complementarity in price setting28. A lower value of  implies
a weaker response of ination to changes in marginal cost. As argued in the Intro-
27Practically, it means that the linearised labor supply term does not drop out of the budget
constraint of the ROT household because the actual labor supply may di¤er from its steady-state
level.
28Note that we introduced strategic complementarity in price setting in the form of Kimball
demand implying that I = 1 in the denominator of expression (25) resulting in a fall in . Alterna-
tively, we could have considered rm-specic capital as a source of strategic complementarity (see
Woodford (2003) Chap 5).
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duction, marginal cost plays a major role in the propagation of the savings shock.
In fact, a low value of  mitigates the deationary e¤ects that are magnied by
staggered price setting channel. These ndings generalise to all other experiments as
well. Overall, the introduction of strategic complementarity can severely constrain
the negative downward movement in output and ination and, thus, the quantitative
nature of our results may alter to some extent. However, qualitatively, the results
remain the same.
It is also of interest to ask how robust the results are to variation in the dura-
tion of price and wage stickiness. According to the calibration section we considered
conservative values for Calvo parameters. Not surprisingly, our results are heavily
dependent on the value of the wage-stickiness parameter. If we radically reduce the
duration of wage stickiness, for example, from the baseline calibration of around 3
quarters to 1 quarters the positive e¤ect of the wage tax cut policy virtually dis-
appears. Christiano (2010) showed that an extreme long period of wage stickiness
(say longer than a year a Calvo parameter of at least w = 0:8) disqualies the
positive e¤ect of a wage tax hike multiplier in a model with only Ricardian house-
holds. However, in contrast to the surprising result of Christiano (2010), we found
in a model with rule-of-thumb households that the higher wage rigidity is the higher
is the benet (the smaller is the output loss) from the wage tax cut policy.
Concerning the size of the discount factor shock we conclude, similarly to Chris-
tiano et al. (2011), that the results are not a¤ected as long as the time at which the
ZLB becomes binding and the time at which the ZLB ceases to bind is the same for
the shocks with di¤erent size.
The next section investigates into the robustness of the results obtained under
lump-sum taxation by considering a di¤erent and possibly more realistic way of
nancing the labor tax cut. Thus, we explore government debt that is paid back by
distortionary labor tax.
4.2 Tax cut is nanced by government debt
In the last two experiments we assume, more realistically, that the uniform29 labor
tax cut is nanced by government debt. Debt is retired by future increases in the
labor tax rate imposed on both types of households (instead of having lump-sum
taxes). To facilitate the transparency of the discussion we conduct the experiment
using the model without capital and habits (see the model in experiment two).
29Uniform means that both types of households enjoy the tax cut and also bear the burden of
future tax increase. Although, in general, it is mainly the ROT household which can benet from
the tax cut.
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Rossi (2012) argues that the government budget constraint cannot be separated
from the equilibrium conditions any more in case of heterogenous households and a
scal rule30. By using a scal rule (sometimes called as tax rule) in equation (27)
we specify how taxes respond to debt. The strength of this response is captured by
coe¢ cient 1. When the steady-state debt is not zero (this is our case) the interest
payments onf debt as well as ination will appear in the linear version of the tax
rule. Also we can include a stabilisation motive for scal policy by determining how
taxes respond to output. In particular, scal policy is assumed to be countercyclical
in the model, i.e. 0 < 2 < 1. Under this nancing scheme the stimulative e¤ect
of the labor tax cut is less straightforward now and will depend on the parameter
governing the response of the tax rate to debt. Since Baxter and King (1993) it is
well-known that even the government spending multiplier can turn to negative if it
is nanced by distortionary taxes period-by-period.
Although scal policy is chosen to be countercyclical in the model (see our cali-
bration) it is not driving our main result. When scal policy does not change through
business cycles i.e. 2 = 1 (taxes do not respond to deviations of output from its
long-run value) in the linear version of the tax rule in equation (27) we arrive at the
same conclusion.
However, the choice of 1 turns out to be crucial. In particular, the closer 1 is
to one the quicker the debt is payed back. In the particular case of 1 = 1 the tax
cut nanced by government debt is totally retired in the next period and, thus, only
the rst and second period wealth of Ricardian housholds is a¤ected. When 1 is
low (or tends to its theoretical lower bound of

1

  1

) then debt is payed o¤ far
in the future and has a wealth e¤ect on Ricardian consumers similar to the case of
lump-sum taxes (Bilbiie et al. (2012)). Due to the presence of interest payments
there is a gradual reduction in debt in the form of tax increases through the tax
rule. Although the countercyclical scal behaviour o¤set the tax hikes (note that
2   1 < 0 in the scal rule as we posit that 2 < 1).
First let us explore the case of a high 1. This is called experiment 6 and shown
on gure 7.The real interest drops to -0.03. In this experiment the ZLB bind for
period 1 to 7 (8) without (with) policy. When 1 is close to one there is some scope
for consumption to rise for both types of households. Several features appear to be
important. Contrary to the previous experiment the consumption of ROT does not
increase considerably on impact but appear to respond more in the long run. The
30Also it is true that the existence of lump-sum taxes in the budget constraint of ROT households
would call for an explicit inclusion of the government budget constraint and associated scal rule
among the equilibrium conditions. Although in our experiments we abstact from this possibility
for reasons noted above.
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latter happens because now it is also the ROT who have to bear the burden of the
tax cut and therefore the rise in their consumption is muted on impact and builds
up only gradually. In contrast to previous experiments with lump-sum taxation, the
consumption of OPTs is higher for their whole life-time because of the income e¤ect
of the tax cut that boost both consumption and leisure.
When 1 is high the debt is paid back shortly after the tax cut and the total
life-time wealth of OPT is not a¤ected. Hence, consumption of OPT declines less
under tax cut policy. However, the rise in aggregate consumption is not enough for
real wage to grow (i.e. to fall by less). Also aggregate consumption follows mainly
the pattern of the ROT. Initially the debt declines sharply. After the shock is over
the debt gradually returns back to its long-run steady-state value.
Now let us turn to the case of low 1. We refer to this as experiment 7 and is
depicted on gure 8. In this experiment the ZLB bind for period 1 to 7 (7) without
(with) policy. As already argued the case of low 1 implies that that debt repayment
takes up long period of time, which ROT experience as a reduction in their life-time
wealth and, hence, they are not induced to raise their consumption expenditure.
Thus, the favorable e¤ects of the labor tax cut completely disappear in the case of
low 1. Again, our results are only marginally a¤ected by the choice of 2.31
Government debt is usually not paid back in the short run. If we assume more
realistically that government debt settled in the medium run there is some scope for
labor tax cut policy although it has quite limited positive e¤ect on the economy. We
model medium run debt repayment by setting 1 = 0:5. In this experiment the ZLB
bind for period 1 to 7 (7) without (with) policy. As gure 9 indicates the labor tax
cut has still some positive e¤ects in terms of hours and aggregate consumption that
deteriorate less.
In summary, we found that the payroll tax cut policy can still be e¤ective if we
consider a di¤erent way of nancing the tax cuts i.e. issuing government debt which
is retired as soon as possible.
5 Conclusion
After augmenting the baseline new-Keynesian model containing price and wage rigid-
ity with rule-of-thumb (or non-Ricardian) households we argued that a labor tax cut
can be an e¤ective tool to combat the negative consequences (fall in output and
deation) of a shock that made the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate
binding. Importantly, we assumed that we cut the labor tax that is levied upon
31Sensitivity checks are not reported here but available on request.
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the households and not upon the rms. Under such an arrangement the labor tax
cut acts like a traditional scal stimulus that raises aggregate demand. Our results
remain valid after the extension of the model with capital accumulation with vari-
able utilisation, external habits in consumption and strategic complementarity in
price setting. Interestingly, there may be scope for a labor tax cut in a situation
when tax cuts are nanced by government debt (instead of lump-sum taxes) and the
repayment of debt is not delayed to the far future.
It would be interesting to explore whether our result remains true in another
popular model featuring monopolistic competition, which predicts that consumption
rises after an increase in aggregate demand even without sticky prices this is the
deep habit model of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
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Figure 1: This is called Experiment 1 in the text. Experiments 1-5 assume that the
labor tax cut is nanced by lump-sum taxes levied on Ricardian consumers. Z stands
for the shadow nominal interest rate. The + signs indicates the date at which the
zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding and circles appear
on the date at which the zero lower bound ceases to bind. ss means steady-state.
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Figure 2: See details of Experiment 2 in the text. This is the model in Experiment
1 extended with wage rigidity.
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Figure 3: Comparison of labor markets under positive and zero nominal interest
rate. WS-sticky stands for the wage schedule under sticky wages while WS-exible
means the wage schedule under exible wages. Source: the left-hand-side gure is a
reproduction of Ascari et al. (2011 page 12) while the right-hand-side one is based
on gure 4 of Eggertsson (2010b page 15 )
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Figure 4: This is called Experiment 3 in the text. Here we used the model in
Experiment 2 extended with external habit formation in consumption.
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Figure 5: This is called Experiment 4 in the text. Here we used the model in
Experiment 2 extended with endogenous capital accumulation.
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Figure 6: This is called Experiment 5 in the text. The model used here is the same as
in Experiment 4 augmented with external habit in consumption, capital utilisation
and strategic complementarity in the form of Kimball-demand.
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Figure 7: This is called Experiment 6 in the text. In contrast to previous experiments
the model used here assumes that the wage tax cut is nanced by issuing debt that
is repaid in the short run i.e. the coe¢ cient on debt in the scal rule in equation
(27) is set to 1 = 0:9.
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Figure 8: This is called Experiment 7 in the text. Here we employ the model in
Experiment 6 but with the assumption that the debt is retired in the long run (i.e.
1 = 0:1 is set in the tax rule).
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Figure 9: This is called Experiment 8 in the text. Here we employ the model in
Experiment 6 but with the assumption that the debt is repayed in the medium run
(i.e. 1 = 0:5 is set in the tax rule).
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